Author: Benjamin MORGAN, Lecturer, Worcester College, Oxford University, U. K.
Some philosophers have proposed that the arguments of the first part of Being and Time help to clarify which areas cognitive science must focus on if it is to give a convincing account of human identity as situated, relational and embodied. These readings of Heidegger typically avoid an engagement with the second half of Being and Time, where Heidegger seems to step back from his most productive insights at the very point when he turns to the question of how individuals round on and transform their commitments, effectively reintroducing a version of the isolated, Cartesian subject that he claimed to have left behind. This paper will show how by going back to Eckhart, the thinker with whom Heidegger was engaging in the early 1920s in the work he did leading up to Being and Time, and a closing reading of the transmission of the mythtical texts, it is possible to develop an alternative version of the arguments from the second half of Being and Time and so give an account of the way in which human beings, thrown into a developing and dynamic, shared situation, feel called to transform their predicament.
human identity, Heidegger, Eckhart, Time and Being, shared transformation
Full Text (International Version):
Full Text (Simplified Chinese Version):